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A Faded Passion? Estes Kefauver and the Senate 
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly 
Daniel Scroop 
In this paper, I examine the U.S. Senate subcommittee on antitrust 
and monopoly (1957-1963), chaired by Tennessee Senator Estes 
Kefauver. I assess the persistence into the postwar years of the 
antimonopoly critique of bigness that had animated the politics of 
reform in the pre–New Deal era, arguing that Richard Hofstadter 
correctly described antitrust as one of the “faded passions” of 
postwar reform. However, Kefauver’s antimonopoly crusade was 
significant in bridging the antimonopoly tradition rooted in the 
politics of the pre–New Deal era and the new antimonopoly politics 
of the 1970s and beyond, particularly as manifested in the “third 
wave” consumer movement. Tracing this connection between 
antimonopoly and consumer politics, I pay particular attention to the 
formulation and passage of the Kefauver-Harris Drug Act, the 
consumer safety legislation from the subcommittee, and to 
Kefauver’s determined but forlorn efforts in the late 1950s and early 
1960s to persuade the federal government to establish a new 
Department of Consumers. 
 
On August 8, 1963, Senator Estes Kefauver became ill while speaking in the 
Senate chamber. He was proposing an amendment to legislation creating a 
new communications satellite corporation when, complaining of stomach 
pains, he was forced to stop. After taking a short break, he recovered 
sufficiently to denounce the corporation as “a private monopoly.”1 All he 
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Charles L. Fontenay, Estes Kefauver: A Biography (Knoxville, Tenn., 1980), 400-
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wanted, he said, in what would be his last contribution to public debate, was 
“to make sure that the corporation pays its fair share.”2 Within 48 hours, 
Kefauver, the most prominent and persistent critic of monopoly in the 
immediate postwar era, and the man for whom business lobbyists coined the 
phrase, “In Kefauver we anti-trust,” was dead.3 With him, one might argue, 
went the last remnants of antimonopoly as a significant force in American 
political life. 
Five months later, in January 1964, that verdict seemed to be confirmed 
when one of the leading U.S. historians of his generation, Richard Hofstadter, 
presented a paper at an interdisciplinary conference at the University of 
California, Berkeley, entitled “What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?”4 
Alert as ever to historical irony, Hofstadter noted that, while antitrust was 
actually just as important in the 1960s as it had been in Theodore Roosevelt’s 
trust-busting heyday, it had nevertheless ceased to be a matter of “compelling 
public interest.”5 As he famously stated, “once the United States had an 
antitrust movement without antitrust prosecutions; in our time there have 
been antitrust prosecutions without an antitrust movement.”6 Historians and 
the public regarded an issue that had once excited great moral passions (and 
had driven the populist insurgency of the late nineteenth century) as 
“complex, difficult, and boring.”7 This happened, Hofstadter argued, because 
by the end of the New Deal Americans had reconciled themselves to a social 
and economic order structured by large organizations. The antitrust 
movement was now “one of the faded passions of American reform.”8 
Given the more than forty years that have passed since Hofstadter wrote 
his essay, a reassessment of the postwar fate of antitrust in America’s politics 
of reform is long overdue.9 In contributing to such a reassessment, I focus on 
Tennessee Democrat Estes Kefauver and his chairmanship, between 1957 and 
1963, of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. I do so 
because until Ralph Nader arrived on the scene in the mid-1960s, Kefauver 
was the leading critic of monopoly in the postwar United States. Although a 
                                                   
2 Gorman, Kefauver, 369. 
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4 Jason Scott Smith, “What Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?” Reviews in 
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Wells, Antitrust and the Formation of the Postwar World (New York, 2002); also 
Tony Freyer, Antitrust and Global Capitalism, 1930-2004 (New York, 2006). My 
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study of one phase of a single politician’s career cannot provide a new 
account of post World War II antitrust politics in their entirety, it might at 
least point to hitherto unsuspected historical connections and trajectories. 
These, I hope, will in turn lead twenty-first–century historians toward a new 
interpretation of antimonopoly’s role in shaping the politics, economy, and 
culture of the United States after 1945. 
The historiographical landscape has of course changed profoundly since 
Hofstadter’s time. One of the more important recent developments has been 
the move to explore the relationship between the state and the economy with 
respect to consumption and citizenship. The work of Lizabeth Cohen and Meg 
Jacobs, among others, exemplifies this approach.10 Influenced by this turn 
toward consumption, but at the same time skeptical of some of its 
assumptions, I here interpret the Kefauver subcommittee hearings on 
administered prices not as an anachronistic expression of a dying 
antimonopoly tradition, but as an episode in modern consumer politics. 
Whereas Hofstadter, Cohen, and Jacobs all conclude that the Kefauver 
hearings on administered prices, in Jacobs’ phrase, “went nowhere,” I argue 
that they went somewhere, specifically in producing important and still 
contested consumer safety legislation in the form of the 1962 Kefauver-Harris 
Act.11 Emphasizing continuities in pre– and post–New Deal approaches to 
antitrust, I suggest that historians may have underestimated both the 
persistence of antimonopoly, and its importance for understanding the 
origins of modern consumer politics. 
Estes Kefauver and Antimonopoly Politics 
Simultaneously one of the most admired and reviled politicians of his age, 
Estes Kefauver was a loner with a melancholy streak and a liking for scotch. 
He was also a formidable campaigner and a skilled self-publicist. Born on a 
farm near Madisonville, Tennessee, in 1903, he was a graduate of the 
University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and of Yale Law School. In the 1920s and 
1930s, he practiced law in Chattanooga, making an unsuccessful bid for the 
state senate in 1936. His election to the House of Representatives came three 
years later, in a special election following the death of Sam D. McReynolds; 
                                                   
10 Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in 
Postwar America (New York, 2003); Meg Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics: Economic 
Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton, N.J., 2005). See also Martin 
Daunton and Matthew Hilton, eds., The Politics of Consumption: Material Culture 
and Citizenship in Europe and America (Oxford, U.K., 2001). 
11 Meg Jacobs, “Pocketbook Politics: Democracy and the Market in Twentieth-
Century America,” in The Democratic Experiment, ed. Meg Jacobs, William J. 
Novak, and Julian E. Zelizer (Princeton, N.J., 2003), 250-75, quotation at p. 267. 
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he was re-elected four times. In 1948, after winning a dramatic campaign in 
which he faced down Memphis boss Ed Crump, he moved to the Senate.12 
Once a senator, Kefauver quickly made a name for himself as something 
of a crusader, a man of “Galahad repute,” as reporter Doris Flesson put it.13 
This he achieved primarily through his chairing of the Special Committee on 
Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, otherwise known as “the Kefauver 
Committee.” In 1950 and 1951, more than 20 million Americans watched the 
junior senator from Tennessee quietly but effectively probe corruption and 
vice in the nation’s big cities. Followed eagerly by the press, the Kefauver 
anti-Mafia caravan moved from one apparently corrupt city to the next, all 
the time boosting his image as the white knight of American politics.14 In 
1951, the Washington press corps ranked him the nation’s second-best 
senator (behind Paul Douglas).15 His eye-catching brand of moral politics 
impressed voters as much as it irritated his fellow politicians, especially those 
in his own party. “Senator Kefauver’s weakness,” James Reston wrote in the 
New York Times, “is that he has nobody for him but the people. It is 
impossible to overstate, or even to explain, the fierceness of the opposition to 
him among his colleagues in the Senate and in the party organization.”16 
Following the crime hearings, Kefauver began a determined campaign for 
the presidency, but his failure to attract the backing of the Democratic Party 
organization frustrated his ambitions. Remarkably, in 1952, he won over 3.1 
million votes in the process of winning fourteen of seventeen primaries. 
Defeating Harry S. Truman in New Hampshire that year, he became the first 
presidential contender to defeat a sitting president in a primary election. 
However, his campaigning style was not suited to an era when primaries 
played only a small role in determining presidential nominations. Adlai 
Stevenson, who had barely participated in the primaries, became the 
Democratic Party’s candidate. Four years later, Kefauver once more made a 
strong showing in the primaries, but this time Stevenson was stronger still, 
defeating the Tennessee senator decisively in Oregon, Florida, and—most 
important—California. This time, however, Stevenson’s decision to let the 
convention choose the vice-presidential candidate rekindled Kefauver’s 
hopes. The party delegates opted for Kefauver, and he joined Stevenson on 
the Democratic Party’s ill-fated 1956 presidential ticket. 
                                                   
12 No one has written the definitive Kefauver biography and the Kefauver Papers at 
the University of Tennessee, Knoxville are a vastly underexploited resource. 
However, see Gorman, Kefauver, and Fontenay, Estes Kefauver. 
13 Doris Flesson, “Democrats to Attack Monopoly,” Nashville Star, 30 Nov. 1954. 
14 In a rhetorical sense at the very least, Kefauver’s anti-vice crusade was not 
unconnected to his antimonopolism. For an analysis of the historical links between 
anti-vice campaigns and antimonopoly rhetoric, see Mara Keire, “The Vice Trust: A 
Reinterpretation of the White Slavery Scare in the United States, 1907-1917,” 
Journal of Social History 35 (Fall 2001): 5-41. 
15 Richard Harris, The Real Voice (New York, 1964), 8. 
16 James Reston quoted in Wilma Dykeman, “Only the Voters like Estes,” The 
Nation, 12 April 1956. 
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Some argued that because Kefauver was ambitious—not a rare trait 
among U.S. senators—he was not sincere in the political positions he 
adopted.17 It is difficult, however, to make that case in relation to Kefauver’s 
antimonopolism. His devotion to the antimonopoly cause never wavered; it 
was his first and last political love. He was striving to combat monopoly in the 
1930s and 1940s, long before he had a realistic chance of running for 
president, and after 1960, when he was no longer a major contender, even if 
he still harbored faint hopes. Indeed, one of the conundrums of Kefauver’s 
career is how he achieved such popularity while basing his campaigns for 
office around an issue that, if we can believe historians, had by this time lost 
both its relevance and its capacity to stir emotion. Campaigning in the 1950s 
and early 1960s, he at times sounded like a nineteenth-century populist, 
attacking railroad mergers and the basing point system as if these, not the 
Cold War or civil rights, were the great issues of the day.18 
Kefauver favored an economy in which competition among small 
producers set prices. Such an economy, he believed, not only guaranteed fair 
prices for consumers, but was also fundamental to the American ideal of 
citizenship, and therefore to political as well as to economic democracy. As an 
excerpt from a one-minute television spot broadcast during his 1952 
campaign for the presidential nomination shows, Kefauver was proud of his 
record of support for small business and saw it as a major political asset: 
During my 13 years in Congress, I have fought consistently against 
monopolies and for small business. . . . As a member of the House, I 
led the fight for the Anti Merger Bill, which recently became law. I 
sponsored the legislation setting up the smaller war plants 
corporation which enabled many small manufacturers to keep going 
during World War II. Just recently, I helped set up the Small Defense 
Plants Administration, which will give similar aid during the present 
                                                   
17 Tony Badger, for instance, argues that Kefauver’s refusal to sign the Southern 
Manifesto owed as much to his national ambitions as it did to any principled stance 
on African American civil rights; see Tony Badger, “Southerners Who Refused to 
Sign the Southern Manifesto,” Historical Journal 42 (June 1999): 517-34. 
18 For railroads, see Estes Kefauver, “Why I Favor a Moratorium,” Progressive 
Railroading, Sept-Oct 1962, series I, box 83, Monopoly: General Correspondence 
and Information, folder 10, Kefauver Papers, University of Tennessee Special 
Collections Library, Knoxville, Tennessee. “Let no one be misled,” Kefauver wrote, 
“as to what the creation of a giant power—such as the Pennsylvania-Central merger—
will mean in the U.S. economy. There will sit on the board of directors of that 
massive combined railroad, policy officials from some of the nation’s largest and 
most powerful banks, insurance companies, steel companies, aluminum companies, 
public utilities, coal companies, and other giants of industrial power. The 
possibilities for discriminations, rate control, traffic diversion, reciprocity with 
suppliers, and the actual influencing of the pricing policies of shippers by that 
railroad alone will be enormous.” See also “Railroad Mergers,” 3 April 1962, series I, 
box 83, Monopoly: General Correspondence and Information, folder 9, Kefauver 
Papers. On the basing point system see, for example, series X, box 2, folder: 1952 
Monopoly, Kefauver Papers. 
Daniel Scroop // Kefauver and the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee 6 
emergency. In the House, I was a member of the Small Business 
Committee. And from my long experience and study in this field, I 
know the needs and special problems of small business. A nation 
with many active small businesses is a healthy nation—and a 
Democratic nation. As President I would do everything within my 
power to further the interests of the small businessmen—to make this 
a vital economy fed by many fountains.19 
Clearly, Kefauver believed that a message constructed around an appeal to 
the “little fellow” still had political potency. He was tapping into a deeply felt 
anxiety about the size and influence of large-scale organizations, public as 
well as private, and playing on apprehensions about the waning of an 
America based on localized, small-scale economies and communities. In this 
way he was echoing the concerns, for example, that had motivated 
participants in the anti–chain store movement of the 1920s and 1930s.20 
The 1950s, however, were a particularly challenging decade for an anti-
monopolist of Kefauver’s stripe. The accelerated trend toward corporate 
merger and consolidation that marked the Eisenhower years gave him an 
obvious and inviting target, but the political and economic climate created by 
the Cold War made hitting it difficult. In these circumstances, Kefauver’s 
strategy was to link what he perceived as the related threats of economic and 
political dictatorship, presenting the antitrust laws as the United States’ best 
defense against corporate control, communism, and fascism—the only means 
of preserving its uniquely competitive enterprise economy. 
For instance, in May 1957, two months before the hearings on 
administered prices began, Kefauver instructed the Senate on how corporate 
bigness was posing a danger to the nation’s political and economic wellbeing: 
With these mergers, competition has been lessening. The “big” in all 
facets of American business are becoming constantly more powerful. 
We have, today, the “big” in the automobile business, the “big” in the 
steel business, the “big” in the oil business, the “big” in the aluminum 
business, the “big” in the meat industry, as well as in many other 
industries too numerous to mention. 
The United States, he continued, was in the midst of the “third great 
merger movement” in its history.21 The trend toward economic concentration 
represented, he said, an abnormal expression of capitalism, the result of “the 
                                                   
19 “One Minute Spot,” 1952, series I, box 83, Monopoly: General Correspondence and 
Information, folder 3, Kefauver Papers. For a more elaborate statement of Kefauver’s 
economic policy proposals in the 1952 campaign, see “A Prosperous American for 
All,” series I, box 76, Bibliographical Material, folder 3, Kefauver Papers. 
20 For the anti–chain store movement and localism see Richard Schragger, “The 
Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive 
Constitution, 1920-1940,” Iowa Law Review 90 (March 2005): 1011-95. 
21 Kefauver speech, 1 May 1957, series I, box 83, Monopoly: General Correspondence 
and Information, folder 3, Kefauver Papers. 
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competitive avarice of certain giant corporate enterprises.”22 This perversion 
of capitalism would lead to dire political consequences:  
I have long believed that it is only a step from the loss of economic 
freedom to the loss of political freedom. Nazi Germany under Hitler 
and Fascist Italy under Mussolini were examples of that step. In both 
of these countries, statism followed the seizure of economic and 
industrial power by the few. Present-day Sovietism is another 
example.23 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Kefauver used his public statements 
repeatedly to emphasize this point. Speaking to students at Pfeiffer College, 
North Carolina, in March 1962, he said: 
I want to talk to you about something that affects not only 
everybody’s pocketbook, but, to an increasing degree, the strength of 
the Free World. Today, there are few countries in the world with the 
system of free enterprise as we know it in the United States. In the 
communist world, private ownership of industry is out of the 
question. Even in the non-communist world, there are many 
countries where industry, by-and-large is subjected to direct 
governmental control. Why, then, has the United States managed to 
remain an island of free enterprise in this sea of collectivism? The 
answer, I think, lies in our uniquely American institution, the 
antitrust laws.24 
The domestic climate ensured, however, that this argument was 
vulnerable to attack. Congressional conservatives and their allies in the 
business community argued that the antitrust laws, far from being a means of 
preserving American capitalism, were in fact a malign extension of Soviet 
methods. To give one example, in June 1960, halfway through the Kefauver 
hearings, the magazine Sales Management carried an article headed “The 
Man Who Would Manage Your Marketing,” depicting Kefauver as a Soviet-
style collectivist: “try to imagine how you would make out under Komplete 
Kefauver Kontrols,” it asked.25 
Kefauver was critical of the Eisenhower administration’s openness to big 
business, arguing that Ike was too ready to let corporations run the nation. 
“The front door is wide open to them,” he declared in 1956, “and the back 
door has a Welcome mat out also.”26 However, even his fellow liberals only 
weakly supported his conviction that an antitrust offensive could put the 
nation back on track. By the 1950s, most liberals were reconciled to large-
scale capitalism. Some, such as David Lilienthal (a founding director of the 
                                                   
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Pfeiffer College speech, series X, box 18, folder: 16 March 1962, Pfeiffer College, 
Misenheimer, North Carolina, Kefauver Papers.  
25 “The Man Who Would Manage Your Marketing,” Sales Management, 15 June 
1960. 
26 “Big Business, Political Control,” 23 April 1956, series X, box 8, folder: Big 
Business, Political Control, Kefauver Papers. 
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Tennessee Valley Authority and the first chair of the Atomic Energy 
Commission), were its enthusiastic champions.27 As Alan Brinkley has shown, 
after the late New Deal, antimonopoly lost its place at the heart of American 
liberalism.28 
Marginalized in this way, Kefauver realized the danger of appearing to be 
a critic not just of big business, but also of progress. In a February 1958 
speech, he admitted, “that the wealth and resources of Du Pont made possible 
the long years of research from which came such developments as cellophane 
and nylon.” The question of whether bigness is tolerable, he continued, was “a 
relative matter” dependent on “whether bigness serves us or we serve 
bigness.”29 
Defensive statements such as these illuminate the limited nature of the 
political opportunities available to postwar antimonopolists. Hemmed in by 
the political and rhetorical parameters of the early Cold War era, and by 
mainstream liberalism’s increasing reluctance to embrace antitrust as an 
instrument of progressive reform, Kefauver struggled to advance his agenda. 
The fact that his subcommittee hearings focused on a highly abstract and 
contested economic concept, administered prices, compounded the problem. 
It is safe to assume that, for most Americans at least, administered prices 
were, to quote Hofstadter, “complex, difficult, and boring.”30 They were 
hardly the stuff successful crusades are made of. 
Administered Prices 
As Robert Bud has shown, the 1957–1963 hearings on administered prices 
originated, at least in part, in economic ideas associated with the New Deal; 
sympathetic economists then kept them alive in the federal bureaucracy.31 
Administered prices were the brainchild of economist Gardiner C. Means.32 
                                                   
27 For Lilienthal’s liberalism, see Steven M. Neuse, David E. Lilienthal: The Journey 
of an American Liberal (Knoxville, Tenn., 1996). 
28 Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War 
(New York, 1996). 
29 Congressional Record, 21 Feb. 1958, 2472, series I, box 83, Monopoly: General 
Correspondence and Information, folder 4, Kefauver Papers. 
30 Hofstadter, “What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?” 189. 
31 Robert Bud, “Antibiotics, Big Business, and Consumers: The Context of 
Government Investigations into the Postwar American Drug Industry,” Technology 
and Culture 46 (April 2005): 329-49. 
32 Means distinguished such prices both from those “set in the market” responding 
flexibly to supply and demand, and from prices in monopolized industries, which 
might or might not be administered. In fact, he argued, it was possible to have 
administered prices in competitive industries, and market prices in monopolized 
industries; see Gardiner C. Means, “Price Inflexibility and the Requirements of a 
Stabilizing Monetary Policy,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 30 
(June 1935): 401-13, at 401. Means first introduced the concept of administered 
prices in a paper he gave in a joint session of the American Statistical Association 
and the Econometric Society in 1934 and published the following year as “Price 
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Means, a leading purchasing power progressive and the husband of leading 
consumer advocate Caroline Ware, argued that in concentrated industries 
prices were being administered (that is, set and then held artificially constant 
at a certain level). During the New Deal, there was a perceived connection 
between administered prices and underconsumptionist explanations for the 
causes of the Great Depression. In the late 1950s, the re-emergence of the 
wage-price problem, albeit in a different form, gave both Means and the idea 
of administered prices a new lease of life. 
The staff members Kefauver inherited when he took over as chair of the 
Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly in 1957 were committed to 
the idea that administered prices contributed to the economic difficulties 
facing postwar consumers and the wider economy. Many of them had been 
leading figures in the federal government’s antitrust bureaucracy since the 
New Deal. Drawn mainly from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the 
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, they included veteran antitrust 
insiders such as Paul Rand Dixon, an FTC trial lawyer from Kefauver’s home 
state of Tennessee, and economist John Blair, whom Kefauver had known 
since 1945, when Blair worked as an economist with the Smaller War Plants 
Corporation.33 Another Kefauver aide, Irene Till, was the wife of pioneering 
Brookings Institute economist Walton Hamilton. She had contributed 
chapters on the milk and oil industries to Hamilton’s 1938 book, Price and 
Price Policies.34 When Kefauver died, it was Till who completed In a Few 
Hands: Monopoly Power in America, his account of the Subcommittee 
investigation.35 
These connections between prewar and postwar antitrust activity were 
evident in the Senate, too, where antimonopolists worked hard during and 
after the war to maintain their opposition to economic concentration. 
Wyoming Senator Joseph C. O’Mahoney took a leading role in these efforts. 
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, he had chaired the Temporary National 
Economic Committee (TNEC), the massive inquiry into the problem of 
monopoly launched by the Roosevelt administration in response to the 1937-
1938 recessions.36 In 1948, he was appointed to head the Joint Economic 
Committee (JEC), a standing committee set up by the 1946 Employment Act 
to report on the state of the economy and make suggestions as to how it might 
                                                                                                                                           
Inflexibility and the Requirements of a Stabilizing Monetary Policy.” He was publicly 
defending the idea of administered prices as late as 1983; see Gardiner C. Means, 
“Corporate Power in the Marketplace,” Journal of Law and Economics 26 (June 
1983): 467-85. See also Gardiner C. Means, “Big Business, Administered Prices, and 
the Problem of Full Employment,” Journal of Marketing 4 (April 1940): 370-78; and 
Gardiner C. Means, “The Administered-Price Thesis Reconfirmed,” American 
Economic Review 62 (June 1972): 292-306. 
33 Harris, The Real Voice, 11. 
34 Ibid., 334-36. 
35 Estes Kefauver and Irene Till, In a Few Hands: Monopoly Power in America (New 
York, 1965); Bud, “Antibiotics, Big Business, and Consumers,” 335. 
36 Bud, “Antibiotics, Big Business, and Consumers,” 332. 
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be improved. The following year, the JEC published a report urging a new, 
wide-ranging study into the problem of monopoly. It was because of this 
report that, in 1951, the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly 
was established. By 1955, under the leadership of Harley Kilgore, a major 
inquiry was underway.37 When Kilgore died the following year, O’Mahoney, 
himself a frail man, took over. Kefauver was next in line.38 
Robert Bud’s argument that we should understand the Kefauver hearings 
as an expression of underconsumptionist ideas rooted in the New Deal has 
considerable merit. It is worth noting, however, that there were important 
differences between Kefauver’s politics and those of liberal economists such 
as Means and John Kenneth Galbraith, who presented evidence to the 
subcommittee. In his testimony, Means explained that excessively 
concentrated industries were raising prices in the face of falling demand, and 
that this was causing the inflation that was harming the economy. He argued 
that administered prices were typically associated with markets dominated by 
a small number of producers, and that such producers enjoyed discretion in 
setting prices because their total profits might be the same if they produced a 
larger volume at a lower price or a smaller volume at a higher price. For this 
reason, he said, administered prices were less elastic than market prices, 
falling less rapidly than the latter in a depression, increasing more slowly in a 
boom. Galbraith, in separate testimony, concurred with this assessment, as 
did Kefauver. 
Unfortunately for Kefauver, however, neither Means nor Galbraith found 
remotely plausible the senator’s conviction that America could use the 
antitrust laws to reverse the trend toward bigness in economic life.39 Indeed, 
the two economists had both played a part in directing the liberal 
mainstream’s gaze away from antimonopoly and toward a form of interest- 
group liberalism in which organized labor would act as a countervailing force 
against big business. Kefauver, Means, and Galbraith could agree that 
administered prices existed and that they were doing real damage; but there 
was no unanimity among them on how best to combat the problem. The 
economists did not share Kefauver’s passionate faith in the antitrust laws, 
which owed more to an older populist-progressive tradition rooted, at least 
partially, in agrarian distrust of concentrated economic and political power, 
than to their own New Deal liberal perspectives. 
Kefauver’s subcommittee probed for evidence of administered prices in an 
impressive array of industries. Adopting a dragnet approach, it investigated 
the bread, milk, auto, steel, and electrical manufacturing industries as well as 
professional sports. Kefauver even quizzed hearing aid manufacturers, 
persuading an elderly Eleanor Roosevelt to give evidence. From time to time, 
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he was able to unsettle some of the most powerful figures in American 
business such as U.S. Steel president Roger Blough. The hearings rarely made 
the front pages of the major newspapers, and never came close to attracting 
the national following associated with the Kefauver crime hearings from 1950 
to 1951; but in the estimation of many contemporary observers, they 
performed an essential function. In addition to amassing 18,000 pages of 
transcripts, contained in twenty-nine volumes, and summarized in a set of 
industry-by-industry reports that stretched to over 1,000 pages, they brought 
the executives of the most powerful U.S. corporations before a democratically 
elected group of senators, who subjected them, at great length and in 
exhausting detail, to sustained scrutiny.40 
However, the subcommittee achieved much more than this. Aided by the 
unexpected emergence of the thalidomide scandal, its investigation of the 
pharmaceutical industry spawned one of the more significant consumer 
safety laws of the twentieth century, the 1962 Kefauver-Harris amendments 
to the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Furthermore, according to Robert 
Bud, the debates sparked by the hearings “played a key part in formalizing 
American society’s postwar attitudes toward access to the new array of potent 
drugs,” laying the foundations for subsequent “debates . . .  that would endure 
for a generation.”41 The story of how hearings on administered prices yielded 
consumer safety legislation is an important one for understanding what 
happened to antitrust after the New Deal. 
The Drug Hearings and the Kefauver-Harris Act 
The drug industry phase of the Kefauver hearings began in December 1959 
and lasted for ten months. By this time, the subcommittee staff had already 
carried out a major investigation, compiling extensive data on 
pharmaceutical prices and profits. They had interviewed physicians, visited 
manufacturers, examined the industry’s relations with non-profit agencies, 
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and corresponded with consumers who had complained to them about their 
experiences. In her pre-hearings report on the industry, Irene Till noted that 
the patent system helped the biggest companies control the market for drugs. 
There was, she observed, “a fraternity of spirit among the large 
manufacturers.”42 They preferred, she wrote, to settle by private agreement 
rather than involve themselves in litigation over patents. Kefauver would 
interpret this as a sign that the entire business of patent claims in the 
industry was of dubious validity. Till’s report also pointed to the “close 
identity of prices” set by manufacturers, asserting that big companies 
practiced “price leadership” and that there was a lamentable absence of 
foreign and domestic competition.43 
In the course of the drug hearings, about 150 witnesses and their 
assistants appeared before the subcommittee. Testimony was limited to four 
groups of drugs, all of which Kefauver’s team had thoroughly investigated in 
advance: cortical steroids, tranquilizers, oral antidiabetics, and antibiotics. 
Typically, each day Kefauver would start by offering a few comments before 
giving the floor to his senior experts, Blair and Dixon. Blair’s method, 
calculated as much to garner headlines as to unsettle representatives from the 
drug industry, was to choose a well-known product, compare its production 
costs to its wholesale and retail prices, then, using State Department data, 
show that consumers in the United States were paying more for the same 
drug.44 
The hearings were never about prices alone, however. They also probed 
the role of advertising and promotion to doctors, the relationship between 
trademarked and generic drugs and related naming practices, the work of the 
“detail men” employed by drug companies to promote their trademarked 
versions of drugs, and whether consumers were sufficiently informed about 
side effects. Although the problem of administered prices largely drove the 
hearings, consumer safety was always one of the subcommittee’s major 
concerns. In Pocketbook Politics, her account of “economic citizenship” in the 
twentieth century, Meg Jacobs describes Kefauver’s attack on monopoly as a 
“dead end,” portraying it as the last gasp of a moribund form of consumer 
politics based solely on “prices” and “income distribution.”45 For Jacobs, the 
Kefauver-Harris amendments marked the birth of a new form of consumer 
politics organized around “safety and health issues.”46 This gives the false 
impression that the Kefauver-Harris Act that finally emerged from the 
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hearings bore little relation to the hearings themselves, or to the drug 
legislation Kefauver proposed before July 15, 1962, when the Washington 
Post broke the news of the thalidomide scandal. 
While the 1962 amendments to the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
may not have directly addressed the problem of prices around which 
Kefauver had initially launched his investigations, it would be a mistake to 
neglect the connections between Kefauver’s consumer politics and the “new” 
consumer politics of the 1960s and 1970s. The greater emphasis placed by 
Ralph Nader and other postwar consumer advocates on safety than on prices 
should not blind us to the striking continuities of concern between the two 
phases of modern consumer politics. Kefauver and Nader, after all, shared a 
crusading style and a highly critical approach to big business, especially to 
monopoly. 
It is possible, too, to exaggerate thalidomide’s role in shaping the content 
of the Kefauver-Harris Act. Thalidomide (a tranquilizer given to pregnant 
women that caused birth defects in babies) was important in galvanizing the 
public and the Kennedy administration. It is hard to imagine that the 
Kefauver-Harris Act would have passed without it. However, Meg Jacobs’ 
argument that the thalidomide scandal separated an older consumer politics 
based on prices from a new politics based on health and safety is not entirely 
convincing.47 Many of the provisions set out in the 1962 amendments had 
been incorporated in S. 1552—Kefauver’s drug bill—long before thalidomide 
became a household word in the United States.48 Kefauver did lose parts of 
his bill, including those that would have led to greater regulation of drugs 
under patent, and a scheme for the compulsory licensing of drug 
manufacturers; but others, including many that dealt with health, safety, and 
efficacy issues, remained. What is more, the relationship between legislation 
and medical scares was not new: health and safety fears after a solvent used 
to dissolve sulfanilamide poisoned and killed more than a hundred people 
prompted the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.49 
The changes brought about by the Kefauver-Harris Act were far from 
trivial. A key provision was the expansion of the powers of the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) so that the production of all prescription drugs 
conformed to “good manufacturing practice” (GMP).50 This GMP element 
was especially important from 1969 on in the regulation of the food industry. 
It has since become a major part of the FDA’s work.51 It made plant 
inspection procedures more stringent, including access to records, files, 
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processes, and all facilities related to the final product. It also required 
annual registration of all drug-making establishments and biannual 
inspection by an FDA official. 
Another aim of the act was to simplify the generic drug names (in contrast 
to catchy trade names) by giving the Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare power to designate the generic name where deemed necessary “in the 
interest of usefulness and simplicity,” and to require review of the names of 
generic drugs to see if revision was needed.52 Furthermore, it introduced 
amendments to ensure that drugs be proved efficacious for the medical 
conditions for which they were recommended. Drug companies had two years 
(until October 1964) to comply with the efficacy provision. Since 1962, 
thousands of drugs have been withdrawn from the U.S. market because they 
failed to meet the efficacy test.53 The efficacy provision was part of Kefauver’s 
bill before thalidomide, as were provisions giving the FDA more powers to 
secure prompt information on adverse side effects and to obtain this 
information direct from the drug companies rather than from journal 
publications and other reports. 
Under Kefauver’s leadership, the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly failed to convince Americans that administered prices were at the 
root of the wage-price inflation of the late 1950s. However, the drug 
hearings—aided by the external shock of the thalidomide scare—led to 
legislation with an enduring impact, requiring that drug companies prove 
that a product was not only safe, but also effective. Hearings predicated on a 
mode of antitrust politics rooted in the New Deal era, and led by a politician 
whose antimonopoly rhetoric harked back to the late nineteenth-century 
populists, produced consumer safety legislation still in force today.54 
Antimonopoly and Modern Consumer Politics 
The connection between antimonopoly and modern consumer politics merits 
further scrutiny. To date, historians of the twentieth-century United States 
have lavished their attention on early twentieth-century consumer groups, 
and on the relationships among consumption, progressive politics, and 
citizenship.55 As a result we now know a great deal about how women, African 
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Americans, and others took advantage of the opportunities provided by the 
Progressive and New Deal eras to forge a new and potent form of consumer 
citizenship, albeit one that has faded since the collapse of the New Deal order. 
However, as Lizabeth Cohen has noted, in the immediate postwar era 
consumer issues were also promoted in a more top-down fashion by a 
network of congresspeople committed to keeping the consumer agenda alive 
at a time when the ideological constraints imposed by the Cold War gave 
reformers scant room for maneuver.56 Kefauver was the most prominent 
member among this group, which also included Paul Douglas, Philip Hart, 
William Proxmire, Warren Magnuson, Edmund Muskie, and Gaylord Nelson. 
Historians might contribute to our understanding of the origins of modern 
consumer politics by examining this network, exploring the relationships 
among its members and establishing the extent to which they acted in 
concert, and analyzing its ideological character, including its debt to anti-
monopolism. 
It is interesting, for example, that Kefauver (supported chiefly by senators 
Douglas and Hart) was the leading congressional proponent of the idea that 
there should be a federal Department of Consumers. Significantly, he made 
his case for such a department in the fiftieth-anniversary edition of The 
Progressive, a magazine started in 1909 by Robert LaFollette, Sr., one of the 
great Progressive Era foes of monopoly.57 Presenting his proposal as a natural 
extension of the work of his subcommittee, Kefauver attacked those liberals 
who had turned their backs on antimonopoly, arguing that monopoly was the 
direct cause of the current economic malaise, which combined rising prices 
with falling production and employment. There was a need, he claimed, for a 
new department to act “as an advocate of the consumers’ interest at all levels 
and stages of government.”58 It would operate as a “more sympathetic home 
for a variety of activities directly affecting the consumer which are now 
performed elsewhere in government,” bringing the FDA, the price work of 
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Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Bureau of Home Economics, and parts of the 
Bureau of Standards under one roof. This would be part of a long overdue 
restructuring of government to reflect the centrality of the consumer in 
contemporary American life: 
In a governmental structure which is heavily weighted by agencies 
representing the producer interest, there is a compelling need for the 
countervailing influence of an agency which will bring to the 
attention of top policy officials the ways in which their actions may 
affect the American people in their capacity as consumers. Only 
through the establishment of a Department of Consumers will the 
voice of the consumer be heard in the land.59 
In March 1959, introducing a bill to establish the new department, Kefauver 
reiterated the link between the hearings on administered prices and the 
plight of the consumer; “the unseen hand of competition”, he said, was no 
longer protecting consumers.60 
To return to the question with which we began, this study of the Kefauver 
hearings on administered prices suggests that Hofstadter was essentially 
correct in pointing to the waning of antitrust as a popular passion in the 
post–New Deal United States. The hearings attracted only moderate press 
coverage and, until the thalidomide scandal broke in July 1962, evoked no 
great clamor for legislation of any sort to address the problem, regardless of 
the industry in question. 
As Hofstadter himself stressed, however, antitrust politics in the 1950s 
and 1960s were critically important. It would be most unfortunate, therefore, 
if the absence of a popular frenzy of antimonopoly activity during this period 
deterred historians from studying the fate of antitrust, and its relationship to 
the politics of reform since the end of the Second World War. This is 
especially the case, I have argued, because there are significant, yet 
insufficiently researched, connections between the antitrust politics of the 
early and mid-twentieth century and the consumer politics of the 1960s and 
beyond. 
Estes Kefauver’s hearings on administered prices were not the redundant 
and anachronistic episode painted by some. They were an attempt, 
spearheaded by a politician who was both a passionate consumer advocate 
and an antitrust crusader, to scrutinize, publicize, and remedy the problem of 
monopoly and its consequences. Their enduring legacy, the 1962 Kefauver-
Harris Act, was not merely a response to the thalidomide scandal. Nor did it 
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mark a clear dividing line between two wholly distinct modes of consumer 
politics, one linked to prices, the other to health and safety. Rather, the act 
and the hearings on administered prices from which it sprang constituted an 
important episode in modern consumer politics, one that illuminates the 
persistent, if somewhat muted, influence of antimonopoly in the post–World 
War II United States. 
